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
Is Montenegro prepared for the arrival of asylum seekers?

Interview

President of the Committee of the Serbian Anti-Corruption Agency,
Dr Zoran Stojiljković

Challenges in the EU

Annual review of
Juncker's Commission



Foreword:

Protests



Vladan Žugjić

Politics is often compared to prostitution. To expect that protests of the Democratic Front (DF) will result in the change of government and democratic progress of Montenegro is equivalent to a client falling in love with a prostitute or vice versa.

Polarisation and political instability always empower the ruling party and boost public support for NATO membership, which is the first condition for the invitation into the Alliance.

Likewise, they strengthen the support among the opposition voters for the one that succeeds in posturing as the leader of the opposition.

The credit for the NATO invitation would naturally go to DPS, and the blame or praise for the, now less likely, negative opinion of the NATO ministers would go to DF.

Under pressure, everything in between will crack. The question of whether to join DF's protests already lead to turmoil within URA, Democrats and DEMOS.

In this way, the protests briefly became a win-win proposition for both DF and DPS – the two essentially retrograde political groups.

Now DEMOS, URA and Democrats are seeking EU's assistance and services to overcome the crisis, although one doesn't need too much political savvy to realise that the Union will not be seen to be actively involved in political disputes of a state negotiating membership. Dialogue in the Parliament is the only realistic solution. Speaker of the Parliament, **Ranko Krivokapić**, said the invitation to a dialogue was imminent. Come December, after the decision on the invitation to NATO, his SDP will have to stop wavering between DPS and the opposition and choose sides.

But whatever agreement they reach or do not reach with SDP, the opposition must keep insisting on the observation and implementation of every letter of the laws on the election of MPs and committee members and the financing of political parties.

The civil sector can provide powerful mechanisms for the monitoring of the election process, by overseeing the work of RTCG, distribution of budget expenditures, budget resources, social contributions, work of the State Electoral Commission, the day of the election... all of which could restore confidence in the electoral process. And the EU will support that.

Calendar

- October 2 **EU donated EUR 5 million to the farmers** / Agreements on the allocation of grants to agricultural households within the IPARD-like I project were signed with 291 producers, mainly from the north of Montenegro. In total, EUR 10 million will be invested in almost every area of agricultural production, out of which EUR 5 million will be returned to the farmers, thanks to the EU financing. Head of the EU Delegation to Montenegro **Mitja Drobnič** congratulated the farmers on taking the risk of investing in agriculture, on believing in its growth potential and on believing that agriculture can propel the overall economic growth of Montenegro.
- October 8 **EUR 52 million by 2020 for the rule of law** / A provisional EUR 52 million will be allocated from the IPA funds for the area of rule of law by 2020. The European Union has been continuously supporting reforms in this area, as the rule of law is the core of the enlargement process. Accordingly, EUR 22.5 million were already invested in this area from 2007 to 2014.
- October 23 **EC calls on the parties to discuss the crisis in the Parliament** / European Commission (EC) urged all parties to engage in political dialogue on the ongoing crisis in Montenegro in the Parliament. "Any solution to the political conflict must be made in Montenegro. Therefore, every political party should take constructive part in the initiative launched by the president of the Parliament with the intention of finding the right solution. Political dialogue and discussions should be held in the Parliament", said the spokesperson of the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, **Maja Kocijančič**.
- October 25 **EU concerned about protests-related conflicts** / EU Delegation to Montenegro expressed its concerns regarding the conflicts which took place during the demonstrations of DF in Podgorica on October 24, which resulted in injuries to the police officials, journalists and other persons, as well as in damaged property. "We expect the bodies in charge to conduct an effective investigation in line with the principles of rule of law. And while the demonstrations themselves present a legitimate and legal manner of expressing political and other forms of opinion, they should also be peaceful and comply with the law", said the Delegation.

Legitimacy crisis, Montenegro edition



By: Vladimir Gilgorov

The author is a research economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.

There are two points to start from. One is that democracy requires change in government in addition to free and fair elections. This is a stability requirement, or rather the requirement of the orderly transmission of power, which is the main characteristic of democracy. The other point is that the use of legitimate coercive power against political opponents is a test of legitimacy and risks a legitimacy crisis. One mistake that governments make is to use legal and eventually police force to suppress the opposition when it tries to take its case to the streets. The risk is that the show of force will mobilise rather than disperse the protesters. The latter is what happened in Montenegro in late October.

The interim score is that the government cannot continue imposing its will by force, but the opposition may have lost the support for the strategy of takeover. So, a compromise with an agreement to check the will of the people in elections is the natural outcome of this legitimacy crisis.

The problem is that it is unclear whether early or regular elections by themselves will solve the problem of stability of democracy in this country. This is because an orderly change in government is needed, which however requires the solution to the problem of succession. **Milo Đukanović**, the current prime minister, has been the leader of the country, intermittently as the prime minister and the president, for about a quarter of a century now. Clearly, the change in government, irrespective of which party or coalition wins in the elections, implies that somebody needs to succeed him. The party he leads, the Democratic-Socialists, has no contender for the leadership, while the opposition has a structural problem.

To see it, it is necessary to notice that the current leaders of the protests in the streets are unlikely, as things stand now, to win in the elections.

The structure of the political space in this country is such that there are Montenegrin parties in government, there are Montenegrin parties in the opposition, there are Serbian parties in the opposition, and there are parties of the minorities (Albanian and Bosniak). So, for the opposition to win, they need to unite with a programme that they can offer as the alternative to the government's one. This has proved difficult due to at least three sticking points. One is the independence of Montenegro, which Serbian parties do not endorse fully; the other is the commitment to Euro-Atlantic integrations, which again Serbian parties do not endorse without reservation, and reject when it comes to the membership in NATO; and the third is the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which the current government does not want to continue to treat as practically a state church, which is why the Church supports the Serbian opposition.

The Montenegrin opposition might be ready to give

up NATO but not the EU and would accommodate the interests of the Church, but it would not be ready to question the independence of the country. Also, the parties of the minorities would go with the Montenegrin opposition, but not with the Serbian one. So, the possible coalition of the opposition parties that can win elections is that of the Montenegrin and the Serbian parties (with the support of the parties of the minorities) with the central role played by the Montenegrin opposition parties. This does not seem what the leaders of the Serbian parties are happy with, which is why the Montenegrin opposition has been unable to win elections and the Serbian party leaders, who are leading the protests, are looking at the legitimacy crisis that will propel them to the control of the government.

Thus, structurally, as long as the Serbian parties are relying on ethnic or national programmes, the majority within the Montenegrins will rule the country, and that have so far been the Democratic-Socialists, while their leader Milo Đukanović will head the government.

That creates a deficiency in the stability of democracy, which has consequences for the public satisfaction and for the role of civil society. There is no doubt that such a long rule of one party and its leader will raise questions of the control of the resources and opportunities in the country, which the civil society is unhappy about. The shock of the economic crisis and of the post-crisis slow recovery with all the social and labour market problems that go with those is also not helping the government. But that is not decisively reflected in the elections, early ones and the regular ones, at least not so far. The ruling parties have the advantage come election time as they have more resources that they can rely on to win votes, but the electoral outcomes have so far been mostly influenced by the sharp division in the electorate and the sharp turnaround which the election of the opposition with the domination of the Serbian parties would involve. So, voting for the government meant supporting the stability of the structure of power, though that risks the democratic stability, worsens the succession problem, and risks a legitimacy crisis; the latter is unfolding now, while the former will have to be faced in the upcoming elections or at some point in the not too distant future. That would require the mediation by the EU and the United States and an agreement to hold elections with certain changes in the electoral rules. Early or regular elections should prove stabilising, though those leading the protests at the moment do not stand to win. Which is why there may be a way to go before a compromise is reached. And then there is still the succession problem and that of an orderly change in government.

Excerpts from the article published at <http://wiiro.ac.at/legitimacy-crisis-montenegro-edition-n-115.html>

Is Montenegro prepared to host asylum seekers

Everything ready for the immigrants, at least on paper



By: Svetlana Pešić

Montenegro was not involved in the discussion of the plan agreed in Brussels between the EU, Germany and the so-called "Balkan route" states, according to which Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia have to make room for temporary residence of 100 000 asylum seekers by the end of October, said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI).



By: Vladan Žugić

However, should the tide of migrants reach Montenegro from Albania, Kosovo or Serbia, the Government of Montenegro said it was readying the capacities for an average inflow of 2 000 persons per day, as planned in September.

Information from public institutions suggests that, for now, there is no reason to worry about the waves of persons fleeing wars, torture and poverty in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq flocking to Montenegro, or about how to host them should they arrive, even though the walls are being erected daily along the Schengen border as well as within the EU.

By 1 November 2015, 1 527 persons filed a request for asylum in Montenegro, out of which 982 are from Syria and 259 from

Montenegro was not part of the discussion for the plan agreed at the meeting in Brussels according to which countries on the Balkan route states have to make room for temporary residence of 100 000 asylum seekers

Eritrea, said the Ministry of Interior (MI). Only in October 2015, 646 asylum requests were submitted. Nonetheless, based on current documentation, the number of asylum seekers was reduced compared to the previous year. Last year, there were 3 554 asylum applications, while only 1 527 requests were submitted since the start of this year.

"Montenegro is still perceived as a transit state where asylum seekers reside no longer than three to five days, which is why they skip the interviews that are routinely scheduled seven days from the submission of the request. This means that in 99% of the cases the Directorate for asylum decides to abort the procedure", said the MI.

MI is responsible for registering asylum applications, while the Directorate for Refugees, within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, is in charge of refugees. Head of the Directorate for Refugees, **Željko Šofranac**, said that Montenegro has to keep a close eye on developments in the region, as well as on the predicted movements of migrants and refugees and prepare itself accordingly, in case these persons arrive to Montenegro's borders.

Last year, there were 3 554 requests for asylum, while 1 527 requests were submitted since the start of this year. Montenegro is still perceived as a transit state and the asylum seekers stay on average just three to five days



Željko Šofranac

“Montenegro will try to answer the potential challenge in line with its economic and social capabilities and the level of organisation of all responsible institutions and international partners”, Šofranac told *European pulse*. “There are several reasons why so far the refugees have avoided Montenegro as a transit option, the most important certainly being the better transport connections between Greece, Macedonia and Serbia and EU member states”, Šofranac said.

Given the daily inflow of 5 000 persons to the Western Balkans states, Montenegro is preparing its capacities for a daily average of 2 000 persons

In late September, the Government adopted the Information to all responsible bodies on activities to be undertaken in case of a larger inflow of migrants and refugees to Montenegro. Based on experiences from region and current migration flows, the Information states that “there is a possibility” that refugees

A refugee centre in Prevlaka is unrealistic, but Montenegro still could become part of the migrant route

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration clarified to the *European Pulse* that Montenegro did not discuss with Croatia the possibility of placing 5 000 refugees in the area of Prevlaka, although the Croatian officials were vocal in their demands.



Davor Gjenero

Šofranac said it would be inappropriate to comment on the plans of a neighbouring country, or on the press speculations: “Montenegro will try to resolve the possible challenges arising from this issue responsibly and in cooperation with other states in the region”.

Davor Gjenero, political analyst from Zagreb, believes that the idea of a refugee centre around Prevlaka is out of the question, even though the idea was considered in the beginning of the refugee crisis in Croatia, when Zagreb and Belgrade were “at war”.

“It was then that the fears that Belgrade could redirect the refugees from Preševo to Kosovo, Albania and Montenegro first appeared. This did not happen and it automatically excluded the option of a centre in Prevlaka. The mere mention of a centre like that causes intolerance in Dubrovnik and warnings from tourist workers that this would in the long run endanger tourism in the area, and in the Adriatic in general”, Gjenero said.

He added that precisely because of this Prime Minister **Zoran Milanović** rejected the establishment of a centre like that, and claimed that Croatia has decided to watch over the border with Montenegro and prevent any entry of refugees in that part of the border.

“The route through Serbia to Šid, and then by trains from Šid to Slavonski Brod and on to Slovenia is well established and as long as it is open the migrants will not search for other, more difficult route. However, should the border between Serbia and Croatia close, a likely occurrence in case of a closure of the Slovenian–Croatian border, migrants would have to search for new routes, perhaps even one across Kosovo, which would place Montenegro on their map”, Gjenero said.



could be redirected towards Montenegro and that the country could face similar challenges as its neighbours.

“Given the daily inflow of 5 000 persons to the Western Balkans states, Montenegro is preparing its capacities for an average of 2 000 persons per day. Existing capacities for the accommodation of migrants and refugees in Montenegro are Centre for asylum seekers – 80 places, Shelter for foreigners – 50 places, and PI “Ljubović” – 25 places: a total of 155 places. By adapting the police premises in Krenza (Podgorica) and Zoganje (Ulcinj), we would make room for another 500 persons, and thus provide altogether 650 places. We would also establish tent camps with room for another 1 000 persons in different locations, according to the current needs assessment”, states the Information.

Based on the present movements of refugees and migrants, we can expect the greatest numbers to come to Montenegro from Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, through border points Božaj, Kula, Sukobin, Dobrakovo, Jabuka, Dračnovac.

Should this happen, the Government would expect the largest increase to occur on the border with Albania in the area of

the cove of Nika, in the vicinity of border point Božaj, as this route has previously been used by the migrants crossing from Albania to Montenegro in larger number.

The Information notes that Montenegro has the obligation to provide aid to every person fleeing from war or persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of certain social group, pursuant to international conventions. “This includes the provision of safe accommodation alongside adequate food, water and sanitary conditions, care for persons with special needs, legal protection, provision of other rights such as health and social protection, education”, states the Government’s Information.

According to the Government’s document everything is set for a mass arrival of refugees – from the Ministry for Information Society providing them with access to the Internet, to the provision of water and food, and the role of the Military in this process. Based on the Government’s past performance, however, it is safe to assume that not everything will go so smoothly in practice, neither for asylum seekers nor for the citizens of Montenegro.

President of the Committee for the fight against the corruption in Serbia,
Zoran Stojiljković

To prevent corruption we need political will, strong institutions and awareness of its devastating effects



Zoran Stojiljković

In countries such as Montenegro and Serbia, fight against corruption can be successful only if the awareness on its devastating effects is spread wide enough, and if there is a clear political will, appropriate normative-institutional framework and a unified, coherent anti-corruption strategy that includes monitoring and evaluation by independent bodies, says **Zoran Stojiljković**, president of the

Committee for the fight against corruption in Serbia.

» *In your experience, what are the key elements for successful control and sanctions against the conflict of interest among the public officials, control of party funds, whistleblower protection...?*

Corruption and its numerous (covert) forms, such as the conflict of interest and manipulation of political influence, are like hundred-headed hydras, leeches, or better yet, viruses that successfully mutate and adapt to, for instance, democratic and pro-European legal and institutional designs. At the same time, it is more than obvious that corruption, especially the systemic, political or “high-voltage” one, appears in plutocratic societies and weak countries with an established devastating combination of opportunities and inclination to corruption. Anti-corruption strategies should be focused on both factors.

The opportunities can be minimised through systemic reforms, and the inclinations can be checked

Fight against the corruption requires knowledge and devotion, as well as the readiness to be the subject of hate and reserve by powerful ones, often to face the lack of understanding by the ones closest to you, not just mere political surfing on the waves of power along with the stupidity and strict training over “political rubbish”.

As far as I am familiar with the state of affairs, the representatives of European institutions very quickly become impatient for labor pains of new institutions, including the “local particularities”, according to which you can hardly occupy some position in Montenegro if you are not previously related with someone in some manner.

by an increase in the transaction costs, or by shifting the scenario from “high profit – low risk” to “low profit – high risk” for those engaging in corruption.

The obligation to reporting and effectively control of property, shares, or let’s say, control of parties’ funds and their exposure to the public judgement practically demonstrate what could be achieved through an effective combination of preventive and coercive, dissuasive mechanisms of responsibility.

Studying the post-communist states, **Rasma Karklins** found that an effective anti-corruption strategy consist of a coherent sequence of four stages and groups of activities in which each logically follows from the previous one: (1) identifying and establishing the facts on corruption; (2) creating an optimal legal and institutional framework and mechanisms; (3) functional network of operational anti-corruption bodies and institutions and (4) monitoring and fine tuning and adjustment of mechanisms and procedures for the fight against the corruption.

» *Sreten Radonjić was recently appointed the director of the Anti-Corruption Agency in Montenegro. Some voices have warned that the retired police official did little to fight corruption during his stint in the Ministry of Interior, and that he is also on friendly terms with the deputy Prime Minister and deputy chairman of DPS Duško Marković. Moreover, Marković is the best man to some of the members of the Council of the Anti-Corruption Agency who appointed him the director, and these members of the council in turn were overwhelmingly appointed by the ruling political parties. What should the public think of a body that is in charge of eradicating the conflict of*



Zoran Stojiljković

interests, controlling political party finances and protecting the whistleblowers when its own leadership is appointed in this way??

Personal integrity and incorruptibility, evidence of professional accomplishments and independence of the position are fundamental assumptions of an effective “anti-corruption agenda”.

People chairing the anti-corruption bodies, be them members of the supervisory councils or the committees that elect them, cannot be appointed by executive authorities, nor be overshadowed by any centre of political power. Otherwise, the whole anti-corruption business is just another democratic scam and a “factory” of analyses and reports according to which we live in entirely parallel worlds.

The obvious outcome is the invisibility and poor rating of anti-corruption bodies and persons who chair them.

» What do you think will be the reaction of the EU, given that the formation of an independent Agency was one of the main prerequisites for Montenegro's progress in negotiations on the chapters related to the rule of law?

As far as I can tell, representatives of European institutions very quickly become impatient with the birth pangs of the new institutions, including the “local particularities”, according to which you can hardly occupy an official position in Montenegro without having prior connections to other important people.

Fight against corruption requires knowledge and devotion, as well as readiness to be the subject of hate and reserve by the powerful ones, and often face lack of understanding by those closest to you – not the stupidity and steady diet of “political rubbish” that allow one to surf on the political waves of power.

» As far as we can tell in Montenegro, the Council and Anti-Corruption Agency in Serbia managed to make good progress on their responsibilities. For instance, you published reports on controversial donations to Aleksandar Vučić's ruling SPP. Could you briefly tell us how the Council and Agency function in Serbia and what are some of the biggest challenges these institutions face?

Serbia is still a highly corrupt society, regardless of the widespread political rhetoric of anti-corruption and the already announced and initiated but still incomplete corruption trials. The political elite, at least while in power, often ignores the independent state bodies and the right of the public to be acquainted with the business agreements of the state, or with private affairs and relations of the politicians who could jeopardise public interest. Unfortunately, public bodies such as the

police, prosecution and courts are still “not immune” to the temptation of pleasing the those at the top of the pyramid of government and economic power.

Nevertheless, during its five years of existence and with the integrity and consistency of work, **Tanja Babić**, director of Agency, and the Committee were successful in creating a strong expectation that property must be reported, preventing accumulation of official positions and instituting the habit of reporting the origin of party funds.

In cultures such as ours this does not happen without an arsenal of effective repressive measures. There were scores of “We are not joking” speeches and hundreds of criminal complaints filed, many of which have received an epilogue in court, as well as initiatives to dismiss some ministers and high ranking officials.

The key challenges, which prompted us to propose a new law on the Agency, are its limited competencies in administrative investigation, and insufficient coordination between anti-corruption bodies and the interfacing of their databases, which is why our proceedings were often delayed or incomplete.

One fundamental problem, however, is that our politicians recognise only the court of their party – to wit, of their party leader, and there is little our initiatives for dismissals of corrupt officials can accomplish if they are flatly rejected or simply ignored by the parliamentary majority.

» Some theorists and euro-sceptics believe that the renewed zeal against high level corruption is in fact the conflict between political-financial clans over the share of the loot, whereby the winner is the one who controls the most and can influence the work of the police, prosecution, and courts. What is your take on this view?

There is a lot of cynical truth in your question and assessment of the real state of affairs, and in the claims that the fight against corruption is politically cost-effective and election-wise profitable, which is why corruption allegations are being politically instrumentalized.

For the powerful, and the media they control, corruption only exists among those whose guilt is to be fabricated by “their” people employed in the institutions of the system.

Nonetheless, as Oscar Wilde said, the critics may know the price of everything, but not of its value – the road from knowing the facts to changing them is very long, but it must begin somewhere.

In societies such as ours, there will be no crucial changes until there are strong civic societies and just and politically adult citizens.

V.Žugić

Italy overtakes France as the world's largest wine manufacturer



Italy beat France to the title of the biggest wine manufacturer globally, with some 6.5 billion bottles produced in 2015. Wine production increased in many European states thanks to favourable weather conditions and it is expected that the prices will remain at the current level. Quality, meanwhile, will also

remain very high. Italy accounts for 18% of the global wine production, France for 17%, Spain 13%, USA 8%, Argentina and Chile 5% and China, South Africa and Australia 4% each, according to the recent estimates. Serbia is listed as 19th among the world's leading wine manufacturers.

Every third plate in Brussels contains the wrong fish



New research of the non-profit ecological group *Oceana* showed that the patrons of Brussels restaurants will be deceived nearly every third time they order fish, as their order is likely to be replaced by another fish altogether.

Restaurants across the EU often serve cheaper fish than what is listed on their menu, but sometimes you can get a much more expensive cod instead of the hake you ordered.

Oceana says that customers are partly responsible, and that they should roughly know the prices of different types of seafood. However, they also warned of the health risks entailed in such swaps, as well as of the dangers to the preservation of fish reserves in the EU. *Oceana* took 280 samples of fish from 150 different restaurants across the EU between March and June of 2015. Researchers discovered that 30% of the fish they got was not the one listed in the menu. Even though the number of samples is statistically small, the research "very clearly indicated" that something is wrong. In two restaurants that belong to the EU institutions, *Oceana* found that 16 out of 38 samples of fish were not what they claimed to be. Interestingly, however, the swap was not always a cheaper version of what the customer ordered.

French without sanctions for the corruption abroad



Despite 15 years of relevant legislation in place, France has not yet convicted a single one of its companies for bribery abroad. This is why some experts have urged the French judiciary to learn from its American counterpart, or to institute the possibility of court settlements for such cases.

Others, however, find that solution to be morally disputable, because the ones responsible for corruption would retain their positions, even though the companies would pay immense amounts for sanctions.

France led efforts in 1999 within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to adopt the convention for the fight against corruption abroad. However, France has not made any significant progress since. Only the aviation and defence technology group Safran was convicted of corrupt practices abroad, but the charges were annulled in the course of appeal. Seven persons were sentenced to suspended prison terms and a fine which did not exceed EUR 20 000.

EU should regulate illegal deforestation in its backyard



EU should "first clean its own backyard" and make sure that its member states implement all of the regulations on timber trade if it wants to fight the illegal deforestation effectively, warned the European Court of Auditors. The Court's report states that it is still possible to import timber of illegal origin into the EU because four of its member states still have not harmonised their laws with the European regulations which prohibit trade of illegally cut timber.

"Tracking the origin of timber is essential for the control of climate changes and reduction of carbon-dioxide (CO₂) emissions", stressed the European Court of Auditors.

Four EU member states – Greece, Hungary, Romania and Spain have not fully implemented the European regulations on import of timber, which came into force in March of 2013. Those regulations prohibit the sale of illegally cut timber and goods derived: paper, wood pulp, wood materials and other.



NGO EXPO – a fair of non-governmental organisations

Where diversity is appreciated



By: Radoš Mušović

On 16 October in Podgorica, TASCO office in Montenegro organised the NGO EXPO – a fair of non-governmental organisations, in cooperation with the Centre for Development of Non-Governmental Organisations (CDNGO) – Resource centre for civil society organisations in Montenegro. 52 non-governmental organisations from around Montenegro presented their work at the fair, making this NGO EXPO the biggest event of this type ever organised in Montenegro. During a day-long programme, the NGO EXPO gathered a large number of citizens, NGO activists, representatives of public administration, business sector, university students, and even students of elementary and high schools. In this text, CDNGO and TASCO provide answers

to the frequently asked questions about the fair.

The Purpose of NGO EXPO

In times of crises, the NGO sector became a bridge between different social groups, a place where diversity is fostered and appreciated, a collective form of the struggle for a better tomorrow. Hundreds and hundreds of activists work

diligently every day to improve the situation in their neighbourhood, city, state. That is why TASCO and CDNGO decided to create an opportunity for them to present themselves at the Fair of non-governmental organisations.

What did the NGO EXPO look like?

CDNGO and TASCO provided the participants with all the technical equipment necessary for them to present and promote their organisations in the best possible manner. They also provided branded stands, LED displays, an interactive corner, special presents for participants of the fair, as well as various multimedia content which contributed to quality presentation of NGOs and attracted more attention from the general public in their work. More than 300 visitors of NGO EXPO received a present from TASCO and CDNGO consisting of a set of publications with information on more than 150 non-governmental organisations, as well as the catalogue of the EXPO



with detailed information on the 52 NGOs who participated in the fair.

Who were the participants?

The participants were 52 NGOs from Montenegro that deal with the protection of environment, human rights, democratisation, social and various other services, youth, animal rights, culture and other issues. In addition to the promotional material, the exhibitors prepared their own products, multimedia material and presented their members, clients and donors.

What kind of civil sector do we need?

“What kind of civil sector do we need?” was the title of the panel discussion which officially opened the NGO EXPO – fair of non-governmental organisations. Speakers were **Daliborka Uljarević**, executive director of the Centre for Civic Education (CCE), **Dritan Abazović**, independent MP and **Goran Đurović**, head of the TASCO Office in Montenegro. They spoke about the challenges of the contemporary civil sector in Montenegro, methods of financing from the public funds, relations with the Government and Parliament of Montenegro and the opportunities for improvements.

Once the fair of non-governmental organisations – NGO EXPO is over, what is next?

NGO EXPO is coming to other Montenegrin cities too! TASCO Office and CDNGO plan to organise similar fairs in the northern and southern regions of Montenegro, both to allow NGOs from these parts to present themselves, and for the citizens to learn about the non-governmental sector and get involved.

See you soon because the NGO EXPO is coming to your city!



Political crisis in Moldova

Between the EU and Russia, between protests and corruption



By: Vladimir Vučković

Government of Prime Minister **Valeriu Strelet**, which firmly advocates the pro-European stance, was voted out of office in late October by the Parliament of Moldova. The initiative for the dissolution of the government, filed by communists and socialists, won the majority of 65 out of 101 MP votes, as well as the support of one representative of the ruling coalition.

It appears that the fall of the Moldovan pro-European government is a regular occurrence in this country, as this is the third time the executive power in this state was changed since the last election. However, to fully understand the unstable political situation in this small former Soviet state, it is necessary to observe its internal political-economic context, as well as its currently unfavourable foreign-political situation.

The dismissal of the cabinet of Valeriu Strelet comes after months of protests of hundreds of thousands of protesters from the civil platform "Dignity and truth" who demanded resignation of the Prime Minister and the president, as well as an investigation of the corruption affair in the banking sector where, according to them, billion dollars went missing. Moreover, this pro-European civil alliance accused the already dismissed government of having done too little to tackle corruption at the highest level, which continues to undermine the functioning of state institutions, or to diminish the alarming crime rate, visible in every pore of the Moldovan society. According to the report of the World Economic Forum, Moldova is among the countries with the most corrupt judiciary in the world. However, the civil platform believes that the person most responsible for internal crisis is the billionaire and oligarch **Vlad Plahotniuc**, who was in part responsible for the arrest of the former Moldavian Prime Minister **Vlad Filat**, accused of corruption in the banking sector. Smooth functioning of the Moldovan pro-European government was significantly hindered by the current unfavourable foreign policy situation. After regaining independence from the former USSR in 1991, the state was practically divided into three political regions: one in which the effective power was exercised by a democratically elected government in Chisinau, and the other comprising two regions (Gagauzia and Transnistria), that are under heavy influence of pro-Russian forces. Compared to Transnistria, which

declared its independence from Moldova in 1991 (its independence has not so far been recognised by any state), the region of Gagauzia remains a part of Moldova, and, given the significant pro-Russian tendencies, advocates closer political, economic and trading relations with Russia.


On the other hand, this small landlocked country is strongly tied to Romania, above all through the cultural links, which offers some support to its bid to join the EU.

Strong Russian influence has been felt ever since Moldova gained independence, and its society is still divided into pro-European and pro-Russian camps. Obviously, the fall of the pro-European government will significantly affect the relations between political powers in Moldova, and the ineffectiveness and the subsequent disappointment with the former pro-European government is also expected to boost the popularity of communists and socialists. It should not be forgotten that Russia is likely to play an important role in the development of Moldova's internal politics, especially in light of the fact that Moldova expressed a clear European ambition and a desire to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in the next two years. The relation between Moldova and Russia have been fairly tense ever since, and the conflict has reached the peak with the introduction of Russian embargo on import of Moldovan products and deportation of Moldovan emigrants who had been living and working in the Russian Federation for many years. Russia's sentiments were further riled up by Moldova's ban on the transit of Russian soldiers across its territory in the secessionist region of Transnistria, which currently hosts a great number of Russian soldiers.

The EU's engagement with Moldova takes place within the framework of the European neighbourhood policy and its eastern dimension – the "Eastern partnership". Key to this regional policy is the establishment of closer bilateral relations between Moldova and the EU through the reform of Moldovan public administration, agriculture and rural development, reform of the police and border management.

Moldova declared independence on 27 August 1991. It is among the smaller south-eastern European states (33 845 km²), and borders Romania in the west, and Ukraine in the south, east and north. It is also one of the poorest countries in Europe – in 2003, its total GDP amounted to USD 6.1 billion, approximately USD 1.370 per capita. According to the World Bank estimates, around 60% of the population is poor (2003). Its main trade partners are the EU (30%), Ukraine (15%), Romania (10%), but – prior to the introduction of embargo – one of the primary destination for Moldovan products used to be Russia.

Chapter 34: Institutions



By: Chiara Gaia Iascone

EU enlargement is a two-way process. It implies the willingness on the part of candidate state to join the Union, and thereby make the necessary changes and alignments of its institutions and legislation with the EU *acquis*. The accession process is sometimes demanding and long-lasting, as for instance in the case of Croatia, where the screening of the negotiation chapters officially began on 3 October 2015, and finished on 30 June 2011. Enlargement and accession of a new state does not only imply reorganisation within the candidate country, in this case Montenegro, but also parallel changes within the European Union. Montenegrin institutions have to be prepared for the challenges that the growth and development in the EU entails.

Chapter 34 covers the institutional and procedural rules of the European Union and the adjustments the EU has to make in order

to guarantee full and equal representation of the new member, while ensuring the proper functioning of the decision-making process. The changes must be made in a range of areas, including voting rights, adoption of the official language, as well as the voting of the representatives in the European Parliament. The weight of the vote, or the number of votes available to each state is determined upon approval of the Council of Ministers, which makes the decision by a qualified majority vote. The European Parliament is the only representative body of the EU citizens, as its members are appointed by direct, universal elections in each member state. There are 754 MEPs from 27 member states.

Once it joined the EU, Croatia won the right to 12 representatives in the European Parliament. The number of MPs varies in line the population of state joining the EU. However, it is difficult to predict the exact number of representatives of a new member state, as the rules on the allocation of seats often changed. Nevertheless, the main principle is that the number of representatives in the European Parliament has to be proportional to the size of the population of a given state. Luxembourg and Malta, as member states with the smallest population, have six representatives each. Indeed, according to new rules on allocation of seats in the Parliament stipulated by the Treaty of Lisbon, no member state can have less than 6 representatives. This rule is to ensure adequate chance at representation of all bigger party groups. Most importantly, the distribution of seats in the Parliament is now based on the principle of so-called “descending proportionality”, meaning that the more populous the country, the more representatives it has, but also that its MPs represent a larger





number of people. In addition to the European Parliament, membership of a new state also affects all other bodies and institutions of the EU - the Court of Justice, the Commission, the Council, etc.

Currently, there are 23 official languages in the European Union, as some of the states have the same official languages (e.g. the official language of Cyprus is Greek). The Croatian language has been recognised as the 24th official language. The question of the Montenegrin language will probably be resolved in the context of future EU enlargement, either as a separate official language or by reference to BCSM (Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian-Montenegrin) as the official and common language of all Western Balkan states.

However, even though there are 23 official languages, it is seldom the case that every document is translated into every official language of the EU. The translation is mostly done to English, German and French, depending on the importance of the translated document.

“The European Union rules in this chapter do not affect the internal organisation of a member state, but the accession countries must ensure that

they can fully participate in the decision-making in European Union by establishing the necessary bodies and mechanisms at home and by electing or appointing well-prepared representatives to the institutions of the European Union.” The transition period, which is used to ensure that both the accession state and the EU institutions are well prepared to accept the new member and new procedures, begins once the accession negotiations and screening of all chapters of the EU *acquis* are completed. The successful candidate country acquires the guaranteed status of an active spectator until full membership by signing the Accession Agreement, which also regulates participation of the country's representatives in the European Parliament, albeit without voting rights.

The same is true of other EU institutions, namely the European Council, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.

The European Union determines the rules and the number of representatives each member state should send to its institutions. There is thus little to be negotiated: in Croatia's case, negotiation chapter 34 was opened and closed on the same day, 5 November 2011.



For the negotiations with Croatia, the Community *acquis* was divided into 35 chapters, not 31 as in the previous enlargement rounds, and this approach is now also applied in the case of Montenegro. These two cases differ only in the decision of the Council regarding the so-called *new approach* to Montenegro, which demands that chapters 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights and 24 – Justice, freedom and security, should be opened as soon as possible. The new approach is the result of the experience of negotiations with Croatia, where these two chapters proved to be particularly problematic and demanding. It was therefore decided that the screening of these two chapters should be of key importance during the early stage of negotiations, even before the final agreement on the opening of accession negotiations. Compared to these and other challenges that the *acquis* poses for Montenegro, chapter 34 promises to be one of its least problem.

States joining the EU have to be fully capable of participating in the decision-making process

The accession process opens up new opportunities for the citizens of Montenegro, but it also entails certain compromises. One of them will, most likely, relate to the subject of language, or the fact that the Montenegrin language will be grouped together with the similar languages from the area of former Yugoslavia, and will not become a separate official language of the EU.

in the EU through the establishment of special mechanisms on the national level, as well as through appointment of representatives to EU institutions.

European café with the ambassador of FR Germany



On 19 October 2015, Centre for Civic Education (CCE) organised a meeting between representatives of non-governmental organisations and H.E. **Gudrun Steinacker**, ambassador of FR Germany in Montenegro, in cooperation with Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). The meeting was part of the project *European café*, modeled after the World Café method, and the topic was *"Three years since the beginning of negotiations between Montenegro and EU – the EU perspective"*.

Daliborka Uljarević, executive director of CCE, opened the *European café* with a warning that "the process of negotiations with the EU sparked an intensive legislative process in Montenegro, which gave rise to the so called unfounded legal optimism". She stressed that "it is important for us to meet the obligations that would contribute to the genuine strengthening of state institutions and their tangible results".

During her address, H.E. **Gudrun Steinacker** estimated that "significant progress was made in technical aspect of the negotiation process between Montenegro and EU, with more than a half of negotiation chapters now opened", but that there are "challenges ahead, reflected in specific conditions that must be met in order to proceed to the closing of those chapters". Emphasis was on the policies of the European Union related to migration, employment and social issues, science and education, but there was also talk of the refugee

crisis and the manner in which the EU intends to solve this issue in the upcoming period.

Ana Vujošević, coordinator of the European integration programme at CCE, closed the *European café* with a reminder that "the process of European integration of Montenegro is to an extent more open compared to the experiences of other states during negotiations, but it is also necessary to make it even more so, allowing for a greater role for the civil society.»

The aim of the *European café* is to create a platform for open, fruitful, and informal discussion that will contribute to the improvement of cooperation between civil society organisations and public institutions, intensify communication, identify existing problems and challenges, develop proposals to overcome them and inform specific aspects of the accession process. More precisely, this was an opportunity to exchange opinions in an informal setting on the current state of the negotiation process, the role and importance of NGOs in that process, the position of different member states and their representatives in Montenegro, and especially of the embassy of FR Germany in Montenegro.

The *European café* titled *"Three years since the beginning of negotiations between Montenegro and EU – the EU perspective"*, is the third in the series of events of this kind, which the CCE plans to organise during 2015 with representatives of Montenegrin institutions, negotiation structures, diplomatic corps and other national and foreign experts in this area. 25 representatives of civil society organisations attended the meeting.



Meeting in Brussels on the refugee crisis

Balkans route: put on the brakes

One thing was clear after the Brussels refugee talks: the Balkan states are called on to slow down the refugee trek. Experts, however, disagree whether that will help get the crisis under control.

Humane conditions for asylum-seekers, better communication among the countries of transit and above all an end to the "disorderly" influx: the 17-point plan devised by the EU, Germany and the states on the so-called Balkans route sounds more like a declaration of intent than anything else.

But it also contains some hard figures: 400 police officers are to help out in Slovenia, the EU border security agency Frontex is to provide assistance in Greece and on the Serbia-Croatia border. The European Union also pledged to help set up 100,000 places in reception centers along the route through the Balkans.

It was Berlin that pushed for the plan, says Serb blogger and PR expert **Mihailo Tešić**. There's a huge gap between Germany's declared goal to take in refugees, handle their asylum requests and the country's limited capacities on the other hand, he says, adding that now we're seeing delaying tactics. "Brussels is telling the Balkans states to slow down the flood of refugees."

Hundreds of thousands of refugees have already passed along the Balkans route. The states along the way

The 17-point plan includes 400 police officers who are to help out in Slovenia, the EU border security agency Frontex is to provide assistance in Greece and on the Serbia-Croatia border. The European Union also pledged to help set up 100,000 places in reception centers along the route through the Balkans.

weren't prepared, even if they should have realized what was coming their way, says **Lidija Čehulić Vukadinović**, who teaches political science at Zagreb University. "We're not ready and we didn't expect this to happen; (...) they are making fools of themselves in Brussels and even ordinary citizens no longer believe their declarations."

Initially, the politicians tried to outdo each other in the refugee crisis, the political scientist points out. Serbia wanted to present itself as more humane than Macedonia, Croatia wanted to be more European than Serbia and Slovenia more orderly than Croatia. But almost everywhere, you see refugees camping out without a roof over their heads, and police using tear gas.

"It turned out that none of these states is in a position to deal with the problem on its own, so we need cooperation on an EU level," Čehulić Vukadinović said.

But cooperation with the EU isn't what **Svetlana Slapčak**, a well-known anthropologist from Ljubljana, expected it to be. Recently, Slapčak launched a petition for the creation of a safe corridor from Greece to Germany, a route with no stops, and "no unnecessary bureaucracy."

"It's no good wondering whether and when Germany has reached its limits", she says. "These people need help now." Images of endless lines of refugees snaking across the Balkans, people walking for thousands of kilometers, are almost medieval, she says. "That only





reinforces the prejudices people already have about the Balkans."

The Brussels plan demands better communication among the countries on the Balkans route, which has been spotty so far. Instead, the various governments point an accusing finger at each other: in Slovenia people say Croatia acts like a big bus company, simply shuttling refugees, which is exactly what Croatia says about Serbia, its neighbor to the east. As a result of the ensuing dispute, the border crossings were closed to imports for days.

"These are all small countries that share a bloody past," says Čehulić Vukadinović. And with an eye on parliamentary elections in Croatia in two weeks' time, politicians have been deliberately fueling the hostilities. "Zagreb often plays the Serb card to score

The refugee crisis may very well give a boost to extremists in the former Yugoslav republics, experts say. However, Serbian blogger Mibailo Tešić believes that the fears of concerned citizens in the Balkans are completely unfounded: "The refugees don't want to stay here." He is certain that nothing can stop people who've made the long, difficult trek and have made it this far.

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points with the many unhappy employed voters who love to hear that someone else is responsible for their misery, she explains, adding that "Belgrade naturally does the very same thing by playing the Croatian card."

The refugee crisis may very well give a boost to extremists in the former Yugoslav republics, experts say. Rightwing politicians in Serbia and Croatia have long predicted that the EU will build permanent camps in the Balkans to put a halt to the flood of refugees.

"It's no surprise that their wary attitude toward refugees is like preaching to the choir", says Slapšak. "Twenty-five years after the collapse of Yugoslavia, we're witnessing an enormous upheaval in the quality of life, increasing social injustice and hopelessness - and people aren't thinking straight."

Demands to shut down the borders are on the rise. Bulgaria's prime minister is toying with the idea, the Slovenian government says fences are an option and Croatia's president would like to send the army to guard the border with Serbia. It's a steady process, says Serb blogger Tešić, explaining that, first, Hungary's fence was deemed un-European, but now, the idea of fences is becoming mainstream.

At the same time, the fears of concerned citizens in the Balkans are completely unfounded for one simple reason, argues Tešić: "The refugees don't want to stay here." The blogger is certain that nothing can stop people who've made the long, difficult trek and have made it this far.

Source: DWDE

The Juncker Commission one year on

The annual performance review of team Juncker



By: Tim King
The author is the Brussels correspondent for Politico

It was perhaps naive to hope that a European Commission that promised to be “big on big things, small on small things” would allow a massive event like the Juncker administration’s own first anniversary to pass modestly unobserved. To mark the day on November 1, the Commission put out a heavy dose of self-serving propaganda: a 168-page report, sub-divided according to the 10 priorities laid out at the beginning of the term. If there were any poetic justice inside the European Commission, President **Juncker** would be subjected to the kind of “annual appraisal” his 20-odd thousand staff have to go through every year. Alas, neither the institution nor the man is famed for being poetic, so it falls to me to grapple with the appraisal form on his behalf.

Every year, Commission officials are asked: “What were the main achievements of the past year? Explain the circumstances that contributed to these achievements (or made them more difficult) and the context. Describe the impact of these achievements (How did the achievements contribute to the goals of the Institution?) If there were significant goals that were not achieved, what could have been done differently to achieve a different result (if anything)? Please cover the main achievements of all work for the institution, including work which may have been done beyond the boundaries of your service.”

The temptation in any workplace is to devote a lot of space to achievements, and little to context and impact. The Juncker Commission falls into the trap of indiscriminate list-making, including things that any honest observer would notch up to simply doing your job.

Its upbeat assessment reports, for instance, that “Vice-President **Valdis Dombrovskis** and Commissioner **Pierre Moscovici** represented Commission at 20 Eurogroups (of which 11 special meetings on Greece) and 3 ECB Governing Councils” as if this was some kind of achievement. For respectively €280,000 and €250,000 a year, plus allowances, taxed at a special low rate, you’d expect these gentlemen to at least turn up.

The Commission steers clear of describing the context of its work and is occasionally reticent on the impact of its self-proclaimed achievements. The possibility that significant goals were not achieved is never admitted, and the context is almost always ignored.

Take, in one notable example, the claims made by team Juncker for “An EU agenda for taxation.” It draws heavily on Commissioner **Margrethe Vestager’s** recent state-aid decisions about unfair treatment given to Fiat and Starbucks by Luxembourg and the Netherlands. No mention here of the LuxLeaks scandal, which overshadowed the early days of Juncker’s Commission, bringing up evidence of complicity in tax avoidance between Luxembourg and global multinationals during Juncker’s time as the head of the government. No mention either — in the section on deepening economic and monetary union — of what was one of the most difficult moments for Juncker’s Commission, and indeed for the whole EU: **Alexis Tsipras’s** surprise calling of a referendum on the bailout plan. That decision, which Juncker indicated at the time amounted to an act of betrayal by Tsipras, was a personal blow to the Commission president. The long-term effects of that episode are still unknowable.

“During the past year, how have the following competencies been demonstrated? — Analysis and problem-solving — Communicating — Delivering quality and results — Prioritising and organising — resilience. What were strong points? How could improvements be made?”

Here the performance review takes one from the quantitative to the qualitative. Surely this is where any assessment of Juncker should focus. His Commission has had a year to set things in motion, though it can hardly be expected, given the limitations of the EU machinery, to have completed much. Legislation on, for example, a capital markets union, or a digital single market, was never going to be in place inside a year.

What matters at this point in the five-year life cycle of a Commission is whether Juncker has set the right course, has the right people in the right places and has responded both quickly and intelligently to unforeseeable events.

An honest and compact assessment (in fewer than 168 pages) would go like this:

What the Commission got right: Give them credit for identifying the right priorities. The 10-point plan Juncker presented in campaigning for the job last year still hasn't been knocked too much out of shape by the vagaries of events. True, migration was not at the top of his list at the outset, but it was in there, ready to be promoted. The points were set sufficiently broad to provide plenty of wiggle room.

By and large, Juncker's reformed structure of the college of Commissioners is holding up well. The decision to have each of the seven vice presidents head a project team of other commissioners appears to be working; the point of greatest friction seems to be the overlap between **Andrus Ansip** and **Günther Oettinger** on digital policy. The choice of vice presidents is holding up too. The college of 28 commissioners looks more rational and less unwieldy than anyone expected.

In his assignment of portfolios, Juncker seems, where it matters, to have made the right picks. The most powerful positions are in good hands: **Frans Timmermans** (Juncker's substitute), **Kristalina Georgieva** (budget and administration), and Margrethe Vestager (competition) are each own not only for their competence, but also for their personal integrity. Any group of 28 people is bound to have a few duds, but what matters over the longer term is to avoid damage to the Commission from some of its weaker members holding potentially significant portfolios.

Where things did not go well: By his own admission, Juncker was hampered by poor health in the early months. Less pain and more sleep might have improved his handling of the crises that afflicted the early stages of his administration: LuxLeaks and Greece's brinkmanship on the euro. On migration, the EU's crisis response has been slow and inadequate. Juncker proposed quotas for the distribution of refugees between member states

and then to berate the national governments that did not accept them. He had more success in mobilizing the resources that the Commission controls, which are not enough. What is unknowable at this stage is whether the scolding will produce belated cooperation or harden resistance.

Where things are unclear: European Fund for Strategic Investment. A lot of time and political capital was expended in the early months of the Juncker Commission on the EFSI, which is supposed to make investments to encourage growth in the European economy. Juncker's team is clear that this is an achievement, but the jury is still out on whether EFSI will have the desired impact. Juncker saw a political imperative to counter the association between the EU and austerity. Hence the perceived need for a growth fund. But it doesn't follow that EFSI will achieve significant growth.

Where there is room for improvement: Juncker is not as good at communication as he thinks he is.

The Commission appraisal form asks: *What languages does the job holder use at work? What is the level of competence? Is one of them a mother tongue?*

Juncker's State of the Union address to the European Parliament showed his fragility. The standard of his English does not match his addiction to informality and waspish humor. However, the communication problem is about more than language.

The Commission appraisal form asks: *"If applicable, how has the competency of leadership been demonstrated in the past year?"*

In admittedly difficult circumstances, Juncker is struggling to communicate a positive vision for the EU. A sharp tongue has its place, but he also needs to provide the EU with the occasional pep talk. Otherwise he risks casting the Commission (and the EU) in a constantly negative light. The 168-page exercise in claiming credit suggests that the Commission leadership feels good about itself. The greater challenge is to make the people of the European Union feel good about their EU citizenship.

Source: www.politico.eu

Human rights: from theory to practice

Centre for Civic Education (CCE) organised the main part of the teaching programme for the XXI generation of Human Rights School in the hotel *Residence* in Miločer from October 22 to 25, with support of the embassy of the United Kingdom in Montenegro, as part of the project “*Youth build Montenegro*”. The participants in the XXI generation of Human Rights School were 23 high school students from eight Montenegrin municipalities: Podgorica, Bar, Cetinje, Kolašin, Pljevlja, Plav, Rožaje and Tivat.

The four-day intensive programme consisted of 21 sessions in the form of lectures, workshops, film screenings, group work, etc. through which the participants learned about the concept of human rights, starting from the history of the idea, through development of human rights through generations, legislative and institutional framework, to a special review of the problems of discrimination, marginalised groups, multiculturalism and tolerance in Montenegro, as well as the contemporary challenges facing young people, corruption in education and nonviolent communication. Lecturers in the XXI generation of the Human Rights School were **Sergej Sekulović**, executive director of Centre for Civic Freedoms, **Danijel Kalezić**, president of the managing board LGBTIQ Association “Queer Montenegro”, **Dragoljub Duško Vuković**, founder of PCNEN, **Andrija Đukanović**, programme coordinator of Roma Education Fund, **Marina Vujačić**, executive director of the Association of Youth with Disabilities, **Maja Raičević**, executive director of the Centre for Women’s Rights, **Milka Tadić Mijović**, director of weekly «Monitor», **Tamara Milić**, psychologist, **Petar Đukanović**, coordinator of the Human Rights programme at CCE, **Miloš Knežević**, coordinator of the CCE Youth group, **Tamara Milaš**, CCE programme associate at CCE and spokesperson for the Coalition for RECOM in Montenegro and **Mira Popović**, CCE programme associate.

In addition to broad theoretical and practical knowledge of the concept of human rights, the Human Rights School promotes the culture of human rights by inspiring and motivating young people to stand up for their rights, as well as for the rights of those who are not in the position to do so themselves, and encourages them to make a more direct impact on their society in future.

Campaigns, social networks and public relations

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) organised the second part of the training “*Campaigns, social networks and public relations*” in Pristina from October 9 to 11 2015, which gathered young representatives of political parties and non-governmental organisations from Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Turkey, who presented the campaigns they developed as the result of the first seminar. Participants from Montenegro were **Svetlana Pešić**, CCE programme associate and **Vildana Lujković**, CCE programme assistant.

Women's representation in the Montenegrin political and economic life

Weekly *Monitor* organised a panel discussion in Podgorica on 19 October 2015, as part of the project “Journalists research and debate – Women’s representation in the Montenegrin political and economic life” which is implemented with support of the embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands. The discussion focused on the principle of gender equality as one of the fundamentals of democracy, and explored the current situation in this field Montenegro. The organisers emphasised that constitutional rights and laws should be used to change the practice of inadequate representation of women in the political and public spheres, but are unfortunately still ineffective. The event was opened by **Ivar Scheers**, political secretary and manager of department for media, public diplomacy and culture of the embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands in Belgrade and **Barbara Rotovnik**, advisor for the rule of law and European integration in the EU Delegation to Montenegro. **Petar Đukanović**, coordinator of the CCE Human Rights programme and **Tamara Milaš**, CCE programme associate, participated in the event on behalf of CCE.

Is there student activism in Montenegro?

Centre for Civic Education (CCE) organised the screening of the film “*Vice Versa*”, in cooperation with the Montenegrin Association for Political Science Students (MAPSS) from Podgorica on 29 October 2015, as well as a panel discussion in the amphitheatre of Faculty of political sciences titled “*Is there student activism in Montenegro?*”

During the panel discussion, **Bojan Stijović**, director of “*Vice Versa*” said he was trying to create an objective story, and thus open up a space to substantiated discussion. **Dragana Tripković**, one of the screenwriters of the film, stressed that freedom is something we all contemplate about, especially if we are involved in film-making or theatre. **Miloš Pavićević**, one of the actors

in the film and president of the Students' parliament, said that there was student activism in Montenegro, but admitted that it is not sufficiently widespread. **Iva Malešević**, one of the founders of student radio KRŠ, said that every student initiative in Montenegro, such as the establishment of the student radio, eventually faces some challenges, but that it is precisely these situations that call for student activism. Another actor in the film and a former president of MAPSS **Dragana Čomagić** said that the biggest obstacle to student activism is the students' motivation to overcome certain barriers and show greater interest. **Gojko Berkuljan**, director, believes however that there are a million problems that keep students at bay and that essentially there is no student activism. **Daliborka Uljarević**, executive director of CCE, pointed out that student activism has to insist on constant social dialogue, protest against the obsolete and dysfunctional education system, resist being caught up in social lethargy and the primitive mantra of "we'll get it done for you", but also pointed to the inactivity of the teachers in Montenegro as one of the limiting factors to development of critical thought within the academic community.

The event gathered about 50 students from different universities, primarily from the University of Montenegro, who engaged in a dynamic discussion of the current and prospective forms of student organisation.

Learning about democracy

Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) organised between October 19 and 22 the *School of democracy* in Banja Luka. The School was attended by 24 participants from Banja Luka, Zagreb, Podgorica and Tuzla, while the lecturers came from Zagreb, Belgrade, Banja Luka and Tuzla. They discussed the issues of ethnic, state and European identity, authoritarian political culture, political system of BiH, current refugee crisis, freedom of the media, the role of women in political life of the states from region, and regional cooperation in south-eastern Europe. As the conclusion, the students organised a workshop on European Union and its values. **Svetlana Pešić**, CCE programme associate, and **Aleksandar Radonjić**, CCE project assistant, attended the School on behalf of CCE.

Education for peace

The fifth generation of *Peace Education Programme* began at the Centre for Civic Education (CCE) on 22 October 2015. **Caroline Jovičević**, PEP manager for Montenegro, facilitates the work of the programme. The curriculum touches upon a range of important topics, and the instructor, **Prem Ravat** is a renowned expert in the field, with experience presenting before international publics.

The purpose of PEP is to help the participants explore the possibility of personal peace and discover their inner resources – tools for life such as inner strength, the possibility of choice, gratitude and hope. Each of the ten workshops consists of several videos, time for contemplation and appropriate reading material.

The Ukrainian crisis: consequences for the relations between NATO and Russia

The Atlantic alliance of Montenegro organised the round table titled *"The Ukrainian crisis: consequences for the relations between NATO and Russia"* on 19 October 2015, with support of NATO, the US embassy in Podgorica and the Communications team of the Council for membership in NATO.

The aim of the round table was to bring together the key political actors in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as the domestic and foreign experts on this topic, in order to discuss the crisis in Ukraine and its impact on the relations between NATO and Russia, and the possible implications for Montenegro. The round table is of particular importance for Montenegro given that it is expecting the invitation for membership in NATO in the beginning of December. Dr **Savo Kentera**, head of the Atlantic alliance of Montenegro, and Dr **Petr Lunak**, from the Department for public diplomacy of NATO, opened the meeting. Other speakers panels were: Dr **Andreas Umland** (Institute for Euro-Atlantic cooperation, Germany), Dr **Alina Polyakova** (Atlantic Alliance of USA), Dr Olivera Injac (professor at the University of Donja Gorica), Dr **Igor Zevelev** (former director of MacArthur Foundation, Russia), **Boro Vučinić** (former Minister of Defence of Montenegro and former director of the Agency for National Security), Dr **Rade Ratković** (Dean of the Faculty for business and tourism in Budva), **Rade Ratković** (director of the National tourist organisation of Montenegro), and **Miodrag Vlahović** (former Minister of foreign affairs and president of Montenegrin Democratic Union). The third session, which discussed the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on Montenegro and its Euro-Atlantic integration – the political and economic aspect – was moderated by **Daliborka Uljarević**, executive director of CCE.

A.V

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For more information, please visit: <http://opportunitydesk.org/2015/11/12/global-undergraduate-exchange-program-2016/>

Erasmus for Entrepreneurs programme

Erasmus for Entrepreneurs programme of the European Commission offers you learning from an experienced entrepreneur abroad during 1-6 months while receiving an assistance of 530 – 1.100 euros per month. Furthermore, it provides an experience exchange (not a traineeship or a job) between a new entrepreneur (who is thinking about having a business) and an experienced entrepreneur abroad (who has got more than 3 years of entrepreneurial experience). The new entrepreneurs need to have a business plan (in their native language) and – optional – an enterprise created in the last 3 years (there is no problem, if you have got a business plan but no enterprise yet). Many participants don't have their enterprise and want to start it after this programme.

The mobility can last between 1 and 6 months. Maximum monthly financial assistance for participants from Montenegro is €560.

Deadline: always open

For more information, please visit: <http://www.missmobility.com/erasmus-for-entrepreneurs/>

CDDRL Pre-doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The Center welcomes applications from pre-doctoral students at the write-up stage and from post-doctoral scholars working in any of the four program areas of democracy, development, evaluating the efficacy of democracy promotion, and rule of law. The Center expects to award two or more fellowships for the 2016-2017 academic year.

Pre-doctoral fellows receive stipends comparable to that awarded by the Stanford Graduate Fellowships program; the Center also pays non-matriculated student tuition for pre-doctoral fellows as required by Stanford University. Post-doctoral fellows receive salaries commensurate with experience and with consideration given to university established minimums for a term period of 9 months. Healthcare and other benefits are also provided as required by Stanford University for both pre- and post doctoral fellows.

Deadline: 15 January, 2016

For more information, please visit: http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/fellowships/cddrl_fellowships

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Editor-in-chief: Vladan Žugić

Editorial board: Vera Šćepanović, Daliborka Uljarević, Svetlana Pešić, Ana Vujošević, Vladimir Vučković

Translation and proofreading: CGO

Design and illustrations: Dragana Koprivica

Production: Centre for Civic Education (CCE)

Address: Njegoševa 36/I Tel/fax: +382 20 665 112, 665 327 ep@cgo-cce.org, info@cgo-cce.org

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or subscribe to our monthly e-mail by contacting ep@cgo-cce.org

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